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Trial Practice and Procedure
by Benton J. Mathis, Jr.*
and
Leigh C. Lawson**

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys the 1991 decisions of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals that made a significant impact upon the area of trial practice and
procedure. One of the most important developments in this area of law
occurred in the case Wright v. Preferred Research, Inc.' In Wright the
Eleventh Circuit examined closely Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 582
and, in a case of first impression, held that when a district court amends
a judgment, Rule 58 did not require that a separate document, setting out
the terms of the remitted judgment, be entered before the time for the
appeal begins to run.3 Another case of particular interest to practicing
attorneys is Pelletier v. Zweifel.4 In Pelletier the court of appeals reversed a district court's ruling and imposed double costs and attorney
fees against a party for filing a frivolous complaint and a subsequent frivolous appeal.' In addition, in Johns v. Jarrard, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the responsibility of federal trial judges in relation to answering
* Partner in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia Institute of
Technology (B.S., with honor, 1981); Washington and Lee School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
1984). Member, Washington and Lee Law Review (1982-1984). Member, State Bar of Georgia and District of Columbia Bar.
** Associate in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia (B.S., 1985); Mercer University (J.D., magna cum laude, 1991). Member, Mercer Law
Review (1989-1992); Senior Managing Editor (1990-1991). Member, State Bar of Georgia
and State Bar of South Carolina.
1. 937 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1991).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 58.
3. 937 F.2d at 1560-61.
4. 921 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 167 (1991).
5. 921 F.2d at 1520-21, 1523.
6. 927 F.2d 551 (11th Cir. 1991).
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questions of a jury and the consequences when a judge's statements mislead the jury.7
II.

FEDERAL COURT POWER

A. Application and Interpretationof State Law
When dealing with unsettled questions of state law, the Eleventh Circuit continues to defer to the district court's interpretation of the state
law where the district court sits. The Eleventh Circuit reiterated this
principle in Ferrero v.Associated Materials, Inc.8 In Ferrerodefendant
hired plaintiff as a building products salesman and plaintiff signed an employment contract that included a covenant not to compete. After working for defendant for approximately fourteen years, plaintiff resigned, and
defendant initiated proceedings to enforce the covenant not to compete.
Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 13-8-2.1,11
which allowed Georgia courts to "blue pencil" a covenant not to compete
so that it can be enforceable and not overreaching or unconscionable, had
just become effective at the time of this appeal." No dispute about this
new statute existed between the parties; if the new statute applied retroactively, the statute would save the covenant not to compete from being
void under Georgia law. Plaintiff argued that this statute could not be
applied retroactively because there was no authority to support that position and, therefore, the covenant not to compete was void. Upon review of
the legislative history, however, the district court held the statute could
be retroactively applied and reformulated the covenant not to compete.
Plaintiff appealed the district court's finding to the court of appeals.'2
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's interpretation that the
statute was retroactive."3 The court stated "[w]hile findings of law are
ordinarily reviewable de novo, this court will defer to a district court's
interpretation of unsettled questions o. the law of the state where the
court sits.' 1 4 Therefore, since the district ..aurt in Georgia had determined that the "blue penciling" provision of the statute was to be applied
retroactively, the Eleventh Circuit deferred to its judgment.
7.

Id. at 554.

8. 923 F.2d 1441 (11th Cir. 1991).
9. Id. at 1443.
10. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2.1 (Supp. 1991). It should be noted, however, that the Georgia Supreme Court has since declared O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2.1 unconstitutional. Jackson v. Coker, Inc.
v. Hart, et. at.,
261 Ga. 371, 405 S.E.2d 253 (1991).
11. 923 F.2d at 1445.
12. Id. at 1445-46.
13. Id. at 1449.
14. Id. at 1444.
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In another case that involved questions of state law interpretation, the
Eleventh Circuit deferred its decision pending the outcome of certification of the controlling question to the state's highest court. In Miles v.
Ashland Chemical Co.,1 the issue was whether Georgia courts followed
the discovery rule for the tolling of the statute of limitations so that the
statute would not begin to run until the plaintiff discovered or should
have discovered that the defendant was at least partially responsible for
the decedent's death. 6 The Eleventh Circuit stated that because this case
dealt with the question of state law that implicated substantial public
policy concerns and there was no controlling precedent from a Georgia
court, the issue should be certified to the Georgia Supreme Court before a
federal court ruled on the issues."7
In Regan v. United States Small Business Administration,' the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether to formulate a federal rule or
adopt a state rule of decision when determining the enforcement of Small
Business Administration ("SBA") loan guarantees." The court stated in
determining whether to formulate a federal rule or adopt a state rule of
decision, "'a court must consider: (1) whether a federal program is such
that it requires a uniform national rule; (2) whether application of state
law would frustrate the specific objectives of the federal program; and (3)
whether application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law.'

"20

The Eleventh Circuit cited previous decisions that had applied state
rules of decision to actions involving the SBA loan guarantee."1 The Fifth
Circuit held in prior cases that the "adoption of a state law would not
hinder the administration of the SBA, [nor was] a national rule for priority on contractual liens necessary. "22 In light of these cases, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed the trial court for its failure to incorporate state rules of
decision as the applicable federal law-to the SBA guaranty.1
As can be seen by the cases above, the interpretation and the applicability of state law in federal courts is still an issue that the Eleventh Circuit continues to address on a regular basis. When faced with situations
15. 924 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1991).
16. Id. at 1028.
17. Id. at 1027.

18. 926 F.2d 1078 (11th Cir. 1991).
19.
20.
1989)).
21.
Foods,
1979).
22.
23.

Id. at 1080-81.
Id. (quoting Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537, 1545 (11th Cir.
United States v. Dismuke, 616 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Kimbell
Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); United States v. S.K.A. Assoc., Inc., 600 F.2d 513 (5th Cir.
926 F.2d at 1081.
Id. at 1082.

1240

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

requiring federal courts to construe principles of state law, the federal
courts look to the decisions of the state's highest court.2 ' In those situations ;here the state's highest court has not addressed a particular question, the federal court will usually turn to the decisions of intermediate
appellate courts.2 5 If there is an indication that the state's highest court
would decide the issue otherwise, however, the federal court may certify a
question to the state court.2 6 Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit has continually reiterated that federal law continues to be determinative of proce2s7
dural issues arising in actions pending in the federal court.
B.

Personal Jurisdiction

This year, not unlike prior years, the Eleventh Circuit has continued to
address the issue of when a federal court may constitutionally exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant. In a factually interesting case by
the court this term, Sun Bank, N.A. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 2 8 defendant
Bunstein was vice president of sales at E.F. Hutton based in Massachusetts. Stevens was on, of Bunstein's customers whose business, located in
Florida, specialized in preparing and completing Navy contracts. In order
to obtain working capital, Stevens approached Sun Bank about a loan.
Sun Bank contacted several references that Stevens suggested would be
able to attest to his financial well-being. One of the persons they contacted was Bunstein, who Stevens told Sun Bank was the manager of the
2
securities listed on his personal financial statement. '
Sun Bank called Bunstein on two separate occasions approximately
eight months apart. During these conversations, Bunstein told Sun Bank
that Stevens' accounts averaged nearly one million dollars. Bunstein also
told Sun Bank that all of the accounts were in Stevens' name and Stevens
owned the securities. outright. The trial court found that Bunstein knew
these statements were false when he made them to Sun Bank.30
Sun Bank sued both Bunstein and his employer, E.F. Hutton, alleging
that it had relied upon Bunstein's fraudulent misrepresentations when it
lent Stevens approximately $670,000. The trial court found for Sun Bank,

24.
Royal
1991).
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See Geary Distrib. Co. v. All Brand Importers, 931 F.2d 1431, 1434 (11th Cir. 1991);
Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 215, 216 (11th Cir.
See Geary Distrib., 931 F.2d at 1434.
Id. at 1434-35.
Ford v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 928 F.2d 1118, 1121 (11th Cir. 1991).
926 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1032.
Id.
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and Bunstein and his employer appealed contending that the district
court lacked personal jurisdiction over Bunstein.3 '
In analyzing whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over
Bunstein, the Eleventh Circuit initially looked to whether the defendant
could have been properly served with process under the applicable Florida long-arm statute.32 In a lengthy discussion regarding the Florida longarm statute, the court concluded that Florida law provided for jurisdiction over Bunstein.3 3 The court then turned its attention to whether Florida could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over Bunstein. In determining the issue of personal jurisdiction, the court stated two factors
were paramount: (1) whether there are sufficient minimum contacts with
the forum to allow the forum to constitutionally assert jurisdiction over
defendant; and (2) whether the assertion of such jurisdiction would offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.""
Relying on Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,35 the Eleventh Circuit reiterated the principle that critical to any constitutional inquiry into personal jurisdiction is foreseeability.3 "To be subject to the jurisdiction of a
foreign state, the defendant must purposely establish sufficient minimum
contacts with that state 'that he should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there.' -37 The court emphasized that the reason behind the
"purposeful availment" requirement was to ensure that a defendant
would not be brought into a "jurisdiction solely as the result of any 'random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts with the forum.' ,,38
Since the two phone calls made between the parties were at the instigation of plaintiff in Florida, the Eleventh Circuit held that Bunstein had
not purposely availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities
within Florida, nor had Bunstein purposefully directed his activities at
Florida residents. 9 Rather, Bunstein's original Massachusetts customer,
Stevens, had simply moved to Florida and sought a loan from a Florida
bank and told that bank to call Bunstein of Massachusetts for a reference. Bunstein in no way sought out any contacts with the State of Florida. Thus, the. court held that the two telephone calls were merely a fortuitous contact and failed to constitute sufficient minimum contacts with
the Florida forum to support the district court's exercise of personal juris31. Id.
32. Id. at 1033 (citing Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990); Alexander
Proudfoot Co. World Headquarters L.P. v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912, 919 (11th Cir. 1989)).
33. Id. at 1033-34.
34. Id. at 1034 (citing Madara, 916 F.2d at 1515-16).
35. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
36. 926 F.2d at 1034. '
37. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
38. Id. (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
39. Id.
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diction over defendant.40 In addition, the court emphasized that two
phone calls, even if initiated by defendant, would not have been sufficient
minimum contacts to meet the due process test for personal jurisdiction."
C. Abstention
In two cases consolidated for appeal, Taifet v.Southern Co. and Carrv.
Southern Co.,' 2 the Eleventh Circuit this term addressed the applicability
of the "clear statement doctrine," the "Burford abstention" doctrine and
the "primary jurisdiction doctrine," all issues of first impression. 3 In
both Taffet and Carr, customers of the utility company brought Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO")" and related
state actions against the utility, which the customers alleged had engaged

in fraud resulting in higher rates.4 Essentially, plaintiffs alleged that defendant utility company engaged in improper accounting procedures that
resulted in greater profits to the company and consequently influenced
the rates the utilities could charge their customers. In both Alabama and
Georgia the utilities may charge only the rates established by the state
and the states set the rates according to the profitability of the utility.
The smaller the utility's income, the more likely the state will approve a
rate hike. Defendants argued that the RICO statute did not apply to utilities based upon the "clear statement doctrine.' ' The "clear statement
doctrine" is a type of statutory construction principle, and it states that
"a federal court should not apply a federal statute to an area of traditional state concern unless Congress had articulated its desire in clear and
definite language to alter the delicate balance between the state and federal power by application of the statute to that area.""4
The Eleventh Circuit declared that the only way the doctrine could apply to the case at hand was to assume that rate making was traditionally
a function of state agencies. 8 Defendants argued in essence that, if a district court was going to be able to award plaintiffs any monetary damages,
it would have to correctly calculate- the rates assuming plaintiffs had not
been defrauded and this calculation would be an infringement upon the
state's traditional realm of control.' 9 The Eleventh Circuit, however, nar40.

Id.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
930 F.2d 847 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 849.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
930 F.2d at 850.
Id. at 850-51.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 852.
Id.
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rowed the application of the "clear statement doctrine" by finding that
the doctrine was only useful where the statute in question was ambiguous
on its face or where an application of the doctrine would suggest an interpretation of the statute that would follow the state statute's clear language and legislative history."0 Consequently, the court found RICO to be
totally unambiguous on its face." The Eleventh Circuit stated that the
statute specifically prohibited "any person" from violating its proscriptions and defined the word "person" as "'any individual or entity capable
of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.' "" Thus, since the
utility was considered to be a legal entity, RICO would apply to the public utility.'1
The court also addressed the issue of whether plaintiff's complaint
should be dismissed on the grounds of the "Burford abstention doctrine."' 4 Under the Burford abstention doctrine, a federal court will abstain from -interfering with the proceedings of state administrative agencies when there are difficult questions of state law involved that invoke
substantial public policy concerns or where the exercise of any federal
intervention into the question would disrupt the state's effort to establish
a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial concern." The
Eleventh Circuit held that the Burford abstention doctrine was not applicable and should not be applied because these cases were essentially
RICO actions with pendent state law fraud claims and, as such, both primarily involved federal questions." Since the presence of a federal basis
for jurisdiction existed, the justification needed for the court to abstain
under the Burford doctrine- would be greatly increased according to
United States Supreme Court precedent.' 7 Consequently, the court held
that any concerns in relation to interfering with any state law public policy were not great enough to invoke the Burford abstention doctrine and,
therefore, plaintiffs' claims should not be dismissed upon those grounds."
The third and final defense defendants utilized was that plaintiffs'
claims should be dismissed based upon the "primary jurisdiction doctrine.'" 9 Under the "primary jurisdiction doctrine," the judicial process is
50. Id.

51. Id.
52.

Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1988)).

53.

Id.

54. Id. (citing Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943)).
55. Id. at 853 (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491
U.S. 350 (1989)).
56. Id.
57. Id.; see also Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976).
58. 930 F.2d at 854.
59. Id.
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suspended pending the referral of the unresolved state issues to the administrative body that had been established by the state and had special
expertise in the given subject area. 0 The Eleventh Circuit held, however,
that the essential issue to be litigated in these cases did not involve utility
rate making, which was traditionally reserved for state public service
commissions; rather, the issue was whether the utilities committed fraud
and violated the RICO Act. 1 The Eleventh Circuit stated the issue of
appropriate rate making would only come into play on the issue of damages after there had been a determination as to liability and, consequently, plaintiffs' claims in both Taffet and Carr were remanded for trials on the merits. 2
III. TRIALS
PretrialConference

A.

In the case of In re Novak,6 3 the Eleventh Circuit addressed the value
of a pretrial conference and a new and interesting issue involving the district court's authority to require nonparties to participate in the pretrial
conference. Plaintiff in this case filed a legal malpractice claim against
David Hammock and his law firm in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Georgia. Mr. Hammock's law firm was insured by
Continental Casualty Company ("CNA"). Under the policy terms, CNA
hired local counsel, Clay Ratterree, to defend the suit on Hammock's behalf. Ratterree's performance was supervised by CNA from its Atlanta
branch office. Ratterree had been authorized to enter into settlement negotiations on behalf of CNA, but had no power to settle the case without
CNA's expressed approval."
Trial was scheduled for Monday, November 13, 1989, in Savannah,
Georgia. On Thursday, November 8, the districtcourt conducted a pretrial conference. The following day the judge met with counsel for a settlement conference. At this conference, Ratterree offered plaintiff
$150,000 to settle the case, pursuant to CNA's instructions. Plaintiff's
counsel rejected the offer and stated that his client needed more money.
In response, Ratterree indicated that he had to take the matter up with
CNA in Atlanta. The district court then instructed Raterree to find out
who at CNA had full settlement authority for this particular case. Ratterree told the court that Mr. Novak had the last word on settlement for this
60.
61.
62.
63.
64

Id.
Id.
Id. at 854, 857.
932 F.2d 1397 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1398-99.
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case. The court then issued an order directing Novak to appear before it
for a settlement conference in Savannah on November 13.85
Novak met with Ratterree and told him that CNA would make a good
faith effort to settle the case and authorized Ratterree to offer the plaintiff $225,000. Believing that this would satisfy his obligation under the
order requesting his appearance, Novak did not appear before the district
court. On November 14, the court issued an order directing Novak to appear before it and to show cause why he should not be held in contempt
of court. Novak challenged the authority of the district court's order on
jurisdictional grounds.8
In an exhaustive discussion, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district
court
had not exceeded its power in requesting that Novak appear before
it. 7 The court noted that the value of the pretrial conference had not
diminished since the adoption of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure." On the contrary, the rules were extensively rewritten and
expanded in 1983 to meet the challenges of modern litigation and to more
accurately reflect actual practice.8 The advisory committee, which
amended the pretrial conference rules, recognized it was commonplace to
discuss settlement at pretrial conferences. 70 Accordingly, Rule 16 was
amended to provide that in any action, "'the court may in its own discretion direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to
appear for the conferences before trial for such purposes as . . . facilitating the settlement of the case.' ,,71
The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that "settlement conferences are valuable tools for district courts [because] . . . they provide neutral forums
to foster settlement, which, in turn, 'eases crowded court dockets and results in savings to the litigants and the judicial system.' ",7" In addition,
settlement conferences allow courts to efficiently manage their dockets.7
Since settlement conferences were determined to be such a valuable tool
for the district courts, the Eleventh Circuit held that a district court had
the inherent power to issue such orders necessary-to facilitate any activity
authorized by the statute or rule.74 This inherent authority at the district
court level extended to the district judge directing the unrepresented
65.

Id.

66.

Id.

67.

Id. at 1408.

68. Id. at 1404.
69. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee notes).
70. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee notes).
71. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7).
72. 932 F.2d at 1404 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee notes).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1406.
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party with settlement authority, in this case Novak, to appear before the
court."
B.

New Trial, Judgement Not Withstanding The Verdict

In the case of Shessel v. Murphy, 6 the Eleventh Circuit discussed the
appropriateness of ordering only a partial new trial under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(a). 77 In Shessel a driver of a golf cart and his wife
brought a personal injury suit against the driver of an automobile that
collided with their cart. The district court directed a verdict in the golf
cart driver's favor on the issue of comparative negligence, and the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the golf cart driver and his wife. The personal representative of the estate of the automobile driver appealed.78
The Eleventh Circuit held the trial judge erred in directing a verdict in
the favor of the golf cart driver and his wife. on the issue of comparative
negligence.79 The Eleventh Circuit stated a reasonable person could have
concluded that the golf cart driver was partially responsible for the accident because there was evidence he had been driving his cart without his
lights on at night and was on the main road rather than the cart path at
the time the accident occurred.80 Defendant contended that, since the
district court had erred in directing the verdict against her on the issue of
comparative negligence, she should be granted a new trial as to all issues
and not just comparative negligence. Plaintiffs argued that the original
jury verdict on damages should stand and that, if any retrial was necessary, the retrial should only be on the issue of comparative negligence and
the court could simply reduce the original award to reflect the comparative negligence, if any, found at the new trial.!'
The Eleventh Circuit agreed witl4 defendant in this case and held that
a new trial was required on all issues, not merely comparative negli2
gence.8
The court stated that "[a] partial new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(a)' may not properly be held unless it clearly appears that the issue to
be retried is so distinct and separable from the. other issues that a trial of
it alone may bejhad without injustice."8 Even though there was no award
of nominal damages in this case, nor any manifest jury confusion, the
Eleventh Circuit held the "improper direction of the verdict as to the
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 1408.
920 F.2d 784 (11th Cir. 1991).
FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
920 F.2d at 785-86.
Id. at 787.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. See Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931).
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issue of comparative negligence may well have affected84 the jury when it
deliberated on the damages it finally chose to award."
This term, the importance of reflecting in the record the reason for a
district court's refusal to grant a new trial or a judgment not withstanding the verdict ("JNOV"), was emphasized by the case of American
Employers Insurance Co. v. Southern Seeding Services, Inc." In American Employers, the liability insurer brought a declaratory judgment action against the insured, and the insured counterclaimed for bad faith in
the handling of the underlying lawsuit. The district court judge declared
that the actual insurance policy in question did not provide coverage for
the insured, but entered a judgment on the jury verdict on the bad faith
claim and awarded the insured $400,000 in compensatory damages and
$750,000 in punitive damages. The insurer then sought a motion for a
new trial or, in the alternative, a JNOV. The court denied both motions
without any comment and the insurer appealed."
During the pendency of the appeal of American Employers, an Alabama case, Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,87 was decided by
the United States Supreme Court on the issue of a due process challenge
to a punitive damage award. In American Employers, as in Haslip, the
insurer argued that the punitive damage award against them violated due
process." The Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on the findings and holdings of the Supreme Court in Haslip. In Haslip the United States Supreme Court "declined to 'draw a mathematical bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable'" punitive damage award." For a punitive damage award to be acceptable, it
has to also be acceptable under state law. The Supreme Court stated that
general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the trial
court were factors that entered into the constitutional analysis.' 0
In the instant case, the Eleventh Circuit held that the post-trial review
of the punitive damage award did not meet the Haslip standard.' The
district court had denied defendant's motion for a JNOV or, in the alternative, a new trial and remittitur of excessive award without any comment.'2 The Eleventh Circuit held that, by failing to reflect in the record
its reasoning for the denial of the motion, the district court made no de84. 920 F.2d at 787.
85. 931 F.2d 1453 (11th Cir. 1991).
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 1454.
111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
931 F.2d at 1454.
d. at 1456 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1043).
Id. (citing Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1043).
Id. at 1458.
Id.
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termination whether the verdict was within the limits set by the state law
and, therefore, violated defendant's due process rights."3
In another very interesting case this term, the Eleventh Circuit discussed the procedural requirements for granting a JNOV and the legal
requirements behind granting a new trial in Redd v. City of Phenix
City."4 In Redd a black police lieutenant sued the city for discrimination
in failing to promote him to chief of police and eventually discharging
him from the department. The district court directed the verdict in favor
of the city on the officer's promotion claim, and after the jury found for
the officer on the discharge claim, the district court granted the city a
JNOV or, in the alternative, a new trial. The police officer appealed the
trial court's granting of the JNOV.9
Upon review of the record, the Eleventh Circuit determined that "the
district judge granted the city's motion for a JNOV even though at the
close of all the evidence [the city) failed to move for a directed verdict.""0
The Eleventh Circuit noted that this action on the part of the district
court was contrary to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) 9 7 and rele-

vant case law." "The advisory note to 50(b) unequivocally states a 'motion for a judgment not withstanding the verdict will not lie unless it was
preceded by a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the
evidence.'"O The Eleventh Circuit reiterated this was a particularly clear
and mechanical rule of the law and, therefore, even though the city did
not comply with this procedural requirement, the district judge could not
"wave his magic wand dismissing [this] procedural requirement as a technicality."100 Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court's granting of the JNOV. 101

The Eleventh Circuit then addressed the issue of whether there was
sufficient evidence in Redd to award a new trial to the city since the district court had granted in the alternative of the JNOV a new trial.10 2 The
Eleventh Circuit declared "[w)hen a district court grants a new trial because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, this court's review
will be extremely stringent to protect a party's right to a jury trial."103
93. Id.

94. 934 F.2d 1211 (11th Cir. 1991).
95. Id. at 1213-14.

96. Id.
97. FED. R. Civ. P, 50(b). It is important to note, however, that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50(b) was amended, effective December 1, 1991.
98. 934 F.2d at 1214.
99. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b)).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1215.
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The Eleventh Circuit further stated that "[t]his [principle was] particularly true when the new trial [was] premised upon sufficiency of the evidence as opposed to some factor which may have infected the evidence
itself." 4 The court held that when there was some support for a jury's
verdict, it was irrelevant what the district court judge would have individually concluded. 105 "'[The district judge should not substitute his own
credibility choices and inferences for the reasonable credibility choices
and inferences made by the jury .

. . .'",

The Eleventh Circuit also

found that there was ample testimony suggesting bad faith on the City's
part in its failure to consider plaintiff for the position of captain.107 The
court reiterated the principle that "[d]irect evidence [was] not required
to prove an employer's explanation for the employee's discharge pretextual; circumstantial evidence [was] sufficient."10 8 Since there was ample
evidence to support the jury's finding that the City had acted with an
improper motive, the district court's grant of a new trial was also
reversed. 100
IV. SANCTIONS

As evidenced by the review of the cases below, this term the Eleventh
Circuit continued to assess costs against nonprevailing parties and order
various sanctions against litigious parties whenever deemed necessary.
A.

Fees And Costs

In Manor Healthcare Corp. v. Lomelo," ° the Eleventh Circuit addressed for the first time the issue of whether a prevailing party to a lawsuit could recover costs paid by a personal entity that was not a party to
the lawsuit. In Manor Healthcare Corp., a nursing home brought suit
against a mayor and the city alleging that the mayor and the president of
the city council extorted $30,000 from the town while acting on behalf of
the city in a zoning matter. The city moved for summary judgment, and
the district court granted the motion and awarded costs to the city. Plaintiff appealed the summary judgment and the award of costs."'
104.

Id.

105. Id.
106. Id..(quoting Rosenfield v. Wellington Leisure Prods., Inc., 827 F.2d 1493, 1498 (11th
Cir. 1987)).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1215-16 (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 1217.
110. 929 F.2d 633 (11th Cir. 1991).
111. Id. at 635.
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Plaintiffs argued that, since the cost of defending the action was actually paid by the city's insurance company, the city was not entitled to
costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), which states that costs
are not recoverable if paid by a person or entity not a party to the proceeding.1 12 The city, on the other hand, argued that, since they were the
prevailing party in the lawsuit, they were entitled to costs under Rule
54(d). 113 In addition, the city pointed out that, if plaintiff had prevailed
in this case, the insurance company would have been obligated to pay
plaintiff's litigation costs and there would have been no question concerning whether the insurance company
was truly a party to the litigation
1
within the meaning of Rule 54(d). 4
The Eleventh Circuit had not previously addressed the issue of whether
a prevailing party to a lawsuit could recover costs paid by a personal entity not a party to the lawsuit.115 The court noted, however, that the Florida Supreme Court recently addressed the issue in Aspen v. Bailus. 6
The Florida court held that a party was not precluded from recovering
costs when someone other than a named party paid or advanced those
costs. 117 The, Florida court found it unnecessary to inquire into the source
of funds used for the initial payment of costs in order to award a taxable
cost to a winning party."
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Florida court's finding and further reasoned that, to adopt plaintiff's argument and prevent the city
from regaining its costs would not only violate the presumption under
Rule 54(d) that a prevailing party is entitled to its costs, it "would also
allow plaintiffs to bring lawsuits agaiist insured defendants without incurring litigation costs after losing on the merits."'' As a consequence,
the Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiff, as a nonprevailing party, should
not benefit from the city's insurance coverage, and that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in awarding the city its costs. 1 0
B. In Forma Pauperis
In Cofield v.Alabama Public Service Commission,21 the Eleventh Circuit discussed the scope and type of limits that could be placed on in
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 638-39.
Id. at 639.
Id.
Id.
564 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1990).
Id. at 1083.

118. Id.
119. 929 F.2d at 639.
120. Id.
121. 936 F.2d 512 (11th Cir. 1991).
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forma pauperis plaintiffs. In Cofield plaintiff, a prison inmate, filed over
100 cases in districts throughout Alabama.12 He filed the underlying lawsuit against prison officials and AT&T in June of 1986. After defendants
were granted summary judgment, the district court, sua sponte, issued an
order to show cause why Cofield should not be sanctioned for his overly
litigious behavior. After a hearing was held on the issue, the district court
ordered all actions filed by Cofield then pending in the Northern District
of Alabama dismissed as frivolous. In addition, the district court ordered
that Cofield send all future pleadings to a judge for prefiling approval and
pay full filing fees. Cofield appealed. "
The Eleventh Circuit held that a federal court may limit the filing of
frivolous lawsuits on a case-by-case basis. 12' In this regard, the Eleventh
Circuit stated the dismissal of Cofield's lawsuits on the ground that they
were frivolous was proper. 12 Moreover, since the Eleventh Circuit had
held previously that courts could take more creative actions to discourage
hyperactive litigators as long as some access to the courts is allowed,1" 6
the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's restriction of requiring
Cofield to submit to prefiling approval because this process would not
totally prevent Cofield's access to the courts.'" The Eleventh Circuit,
however, overturned the trial court's ruling requiring Cofield to pay full
filing fees in the future.28 The Eleventh Circuit stated that by requiring
Cofield to pay all fees, the trial court essentially adopted a presumption
of frivolity in Cofield's future cases and such a presumption was inappropriate because it could have the effect of closing the courthouse doors to
him."2' The court noted that an individual's right of access to the courts
is fundamentally important, but may be balanced against the traditional
12 0
right of courts to manage their dockets and limit abusive filings.
C. Rule 11
In Pelletier' v. Zweifel,'23 an alleged shareholder brought an action
against the corporation's former attorney and former president alleging
violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 513-14.
Id. at 514-18.
Id. at 518; see also In re Green, 669 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
936 F.2d at 515.
See Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986).
936 F.2d at 518.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 517.
921 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1991).

1252

MERCER LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 43

("RICO") and securities laws.' 32 The district court granted defendants'
motion to dismiss several of plaintiff's claims on the grounds that plaintiff failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. In addition,
the court granted summary judgment for defendant. After the district
court granted defendants' motion, defendants moved the court, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, to impose sanctions on plaintiff
because the claims plaintiff had brought were baseless and in bad faith.
The district court denied defendants' motion for sanctions. Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss, and
defendants cross appealed the court's denial of their motion for Rule 11
sanctions."'8 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order of
dismissal and of summary judgment, but reversed the court's denial of
defendant's Rule 11 motion.'" The Eleventh Circuit'stated
three types of conduct warranted the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions: (1)
when a party files a pleading that has no reasonable factual basis; (2)
when the party files a pleading that is based on a legal theory that has no
reasonable chance of success and that cannot be advanced as a reasonable argument to change existing laws; and (3)'5when the party files a
pleading in bad faith for an improper purpose.
Upon close review of the merits of plaintiff's complaint, the court found
that plaintiff "brought this suit purely to harass [defendant] and, in the
process, to extract a settlement from him."'' In Pelletier the Eleventh
Circuit stated: "A district court . . . must impose sanctions sua sponte
whenever it finds a complaint to be frivolous. The [district court] below
operated under an erroneous view of the law: it should have conducted-on its own initiative-a much more searching inquiry into the
merits of [plaintiff's] complaint."18 ' The court reversed the district
court's denial of rule 11 sanctions.8 8
Next, the court addressed the issue of whether the sanctions in this
case should fall upon plaintiff and his attorney equally, or whether it
should be apportioned between them in relation to their individual culpability.'39 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that plaintiff and his attorney
were equally culpable and, therefore, the sanctions should be "borne by
them equally-they should be liable, jointly and severely, for the full
132. Id. at 1470.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1523.
135. Id. at 1514; see also United States v. Milarn, 855 F.2d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1988);
Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987).
136. 921 F.2d at 1517.
137. Id. at 1514.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1522.
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monetary amount of the sanction imposed."140 The Eleventh Circuit.
noted that from the beginning, the district court judge had warned plaintiff and his attorney that they were "'treading on mighty dangerous
grounds'" and asked them whether they were "'familiar with Rule
11.' "1" Despite the warnings, plaintiff and his attorney continued to
prosecute the claim. The Eleventh Circuit found that plaintiff and his
attorney continued to press on with the claim not only with no evidence
of fraud, but also strong evidence that the claim was meritless. 42 Based
on this finding, the Eleventh Circuit awarded defendant double costs and
reasonable attorney fees in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate
1 43
Procedure 38 for opposing plaintiff's appeal.
As evidenced by Pelletier,the Eleventh Circuit took a strong stand regarding the impropriety of parties filing frivolous complaints or frivolous
appeals. In dealing with Rule 11 determinations by a district court, the
Eleventh Circuit applies an abuse of discretion standard of review. 144 Pelletier makes clear that the Eleventh Circuit will closely scrutinize any
district court ruling regarding Rule 11 sanctions and not hesitate to overturn the district court's finding if it determines the district court abused
its discretion regarding the Rule 11 sanctions.
V.

A.

JUDGMENTS

Entry of Judgments and Timeliness of Appeals

In Wright v. Preferred Research, Inc.,1 4 the Eleventh Circuit addressed the question of whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58146 requires a separate document be entered setting out the terms of an altered
judgment before the time for an appeal begins to run.1 47 In relevant part,
Rule 58 provides that "[e]very judgment shall be set forth on a separate
''1 4
document. 8
In Wright the district court entered a jury verdict awarding plaintiff
1 49
$7,000 in compensatory damages and $1,500,000 in punitive damages.
The judgment was set forth on a separate document in accordance with
Rule 58. Defendant then filed motions for JNOV, a new trial, and a stay
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1523.
Id. (citing FED. R. APp. P 38).
Id. at 1514.
937 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1991).
FED. R. Cv. P. 58.
937 F.2d at 1558.
FED. R. Civ. P. 58.
937 F.2d at 1557.
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of the proceedings. The district court granted defendant's -motion to stay
the proceedings pending the disposition of defendant's other motions.' 0
Approximately six months later, the district court denied defendant's motion for JNOV and a new trial on the condition that plaintiff consent to a
remittitur of $1,350,000. If plaintiff refused to consent, the court stated it
would award a new trial on the issue of defendant's damages. Plaintiff
'consented to the remittitur and at the same time filed a motion to reconsider the remittitur order.15 1
Prior to the court ruling on plaintiff's motion to reconsider the remittitur order, defendant filed a notice of appeal. The district court denied
plaintiff's motion to reconsider the remittitur order. The remitted judgmenit was not entered on a separate document until eleven months later.
Defendant failed to file another notice of appeal until twelve days after
this remitted judgment was entered on a separate document in compliance with Rule 58.152
Essentially, plaintiff contended that the remitted judgment became final on the day the court denied plaintiff's motion to reconsider the order
of remittitur and, therefore, defendant filed its notice of appeal some
three weeks before the judgment was even final. In addition, plaintiff argued that defendant filed the second notice of appeal too late because it
was not filed until eleven months after the court's order denying plaintiff's motion to reconsider the order of remittitur."
Defendant argued that because the remitted judgment was not entered
in compliance with Rule 58 until eleven months after the initial judgment
was entered, the time for appeal did not begin to run until that date.
Therefore, defendant filed the second notice of appeal in a timely
1
manner. "
The Eleventh Circuit succinctly stated the issue on appeal to be:
"When a district court amends a judgment, for example by remitting the
amount of the judgment, does Fed. R. of Civ. Pro. 58 require that a separate document setting out the terms of the remitted judgment be entered
before the time for appeal begins to run?"1 5 If the remitted judgment
needed to be placed on a separate document in order for the time for
appeal to begin to run, then defendants in this case filed their notice of
appeal in a timely manner. However, if the remitted judgment did not
have to be entered on a separate document prior to the time for the ap150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1558.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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peal to begin to run, then the Eleventh Circuit was without jurisdiction to
decide the case because defendant's notice of appeal was not timely. 1"
The Eleventh Circuit noted "'[the sole purpose of the separate document requirement, which was added to Rule 58 in 1963, was to clarify
when the time for appeal. . begins to run.' "1157 After reviewing the decisions of other circuits regarding this issue, the Eleventh Circuit stated
that there were three possible interpretations of Rule 58:
First, we might embrace an interpretation that requires the district court
to enter a new separate document whenever any change, however minor,
is made to the original judgment. Second, we could opt for an interpretation that would require another separate document only when the court
makes a significant change to the judgment. Third, we could interpret
Rule 58 to require no additional separate document when an otherwise
final judgment is amended. 1"
After reviewing all of the options, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the
third option that required "no second separate document when a district
court amends a judgment."' 1" The court chose this option because it
would not detract from the certainty that Rule 58 seeks to provide."" The
court also reasoned that, if the time for filing an appeal began to run
upon the entry of a final judgment, regardless of whether it was altered at
a later date, the parties would have a certain date under which to calculate when their notices of appeals must be filed."' Consequently, the
Eleventh Circuit dismissed defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction."6 2
B. Summary Judgment
This term did not mark any significant change in the law regarding
summary judgment. The case of Easterwood v.CSX Transportation,
Inc.1 3 is worth noting because the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court's award of summary judgment on the grounds that the record did
not reflect the fact that defendant:requested a summary judgment.' 6' The
Eleventh Circuit stated that a district court could not grant summary
judgment upon its own initiative.' " Rather, the district court could only
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id. at 1559 (quoting Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 384 (1978)).
Id. at 1560.
Id. at 1560-61.
Id. at 1561.
Id.
Id.
933 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1556.
Id.
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grant summary judgment if a party moves for a summary judgment on
that issue.16
The case of Brown v.American Honda Motor Co. 67 is also noteworthy
because of the discussion regarding the general presumption against using
summary judgment to resolve the largely factual question concerning discriminatory intent in a civil rights claim.RR Further, Courson v. McMillian '69 contains a detailed discussion of the standard for a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity. 70 The Eleventh Circuit
"requires a defendant to establish his entitlement to qualified immunity
as a matter of law by showing that no genuine issues of material fact
relating to the implicated legal questions exist. 1 7 1 In other words, there
has to be no genuine issues of material fact in relation to whether the
defendant's conduct violated clearly established statutory or 72constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
VI.

SERVICE OF PROCESS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(2)(C),1 7 3 a summons and
complaint may be served upon a competent adult by
[M]ailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint ... to the person
to be served, together with two copies of a notice and acknowledgement
conforming substantially to Form 18-A and a return envelope, postage
prepaid, addressed to the sender. If no acknowledgement of service
under this subdivision of this Rule is received by the sender within 20
days after the date of mailing, service of such summons and complaint
shall be made under subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph ... ""
During this term the Eleventh Circuit reexamined Rule 4(c)(2)(C) in
Schnabel v. Wells.17 6 In Schnabel plaintiff brought an action against defendant two days before the expiration of the statute of limitations.1 7
Plaintiff served the copy of the summons and complaint upon defendant
by certified mail, return receipt requested, along with a cover letter instructing defendant to contact his insurance carrier and advising defend166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(b) and (c).
939 F.2d*946 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 950.
939 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1486.
Id.;
see also Hutton v. Strickland, 919 F.2d 1531, 1536 (11th Cir. 1990).
939 F.2d at 1487 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
FED, R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C).
FED. R, Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
922 F.2d 726 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 727.
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ant to file his answer in a timely manner. Defendant filed a timely answer
and asserted several defenses to the lawsuit, including the defense of in-'
sufficient service of process. At no time during the discovery process did
plaintiff ever attempt to effectuate personal service on defendant. Several
months after discovery had begun, defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that service of process had never been perfected
and, therefore, the statute of limitations barred plaintiff's claim. 1"
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's grant of summary
judgment to defendant and stated that rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) mandated the
district court's ruling. 178 "If a defendant receives mail service, but chooses
not to respond, the plaintiff must effect personal service." 17' The Eleventh Circuit emphasized further that, even though defendant had actual
notice of the lawsuit, the requirements of proper service under rule 4
0
must still be followed.1
Another interesting case involving the procedural requirements under
5
Rule 4 was Prisco v. Frank."'
In Prisco a discharged postal employee
filed a discrimination claim against the United States Postal Service." ss
Plaintiff mailed the complaint to the United States Attorney's office
rather than delivering it to the United States Attorney's office as required
by Rule 4(d)(4).' Rule 4(d)(4) requires a plaintiff to serve a copy of the
summons and complaint upon the United States by delivering a copy of
the summons and the complaint to the United States attorney for the
district in which the action is brought.16 ' The plaintiff must also send
copies by registered or certified mail to the United States Attorney General in Washington, D.C.' 85 Since plaintiff in this case did not follow the
requirements of Rule 4(d), defendant moved for dismissal on the grounds
that service of process had not been perfected. The district court granted
defendant's motion, and plaintiff appealed.' 86
Plaintiff argued on appeal that the improper service of process on his
part should be excused for "good cause" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j).'0 Rule 4(j) states:
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id. at 728.
Id. (emphasis added).

180. Id.
181. 929 F.2d 603 (11th Cir. 1991).
182. Id. at 604.
183.
184.
185,
186.
187.

FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4).

Id.
Id.
929 F.2d at 604.
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If the service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, and the party on

whose behalf such service was required cannot show good cause why such
service was not made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as
to that defendant . .

.

.

The Eleventh Circuit upheld the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint by noting that the courts utilized the good cause standard under
Rule 4(j) only when some outside factor, such as reliance on faulty advice,
was the reason for the improper service. 18 ' In this case, however, plaintiff
simply neglected to perfect service of process and, therefore, the court
properly dismissed the complaint. 190
VII.

DIsCOVERY

During this term the Eleventh Circuit addressed various issues involved
in the discovery process. One of the more interesting issues, due to the
power it grants to district judges, was discussed in Avirgan v. Hull.' In
Avirgan plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in restricting discovery
to a certain time period and also erred in restricting discovery to a certain
subject matter. Plaintiffs alleged that these restrictions deprived them of
the opportunity to conduct adequate discovery and requested that the
court allow more discovery. '
The Eleventh Circuit stated that when "a significant amount of discovery has been obtained, and it appears that further discovery will not be
helpful in resolving the issues, a request for further discovery is properly
denied."11 3 The Eleventh Circuit reiterated that a district judge has wide
discretion in determining the scope and the length of discovery, and in
this case, the court held the district judge was correct to limit the scope
4
and had not abused his discretion."
Another case in which plaintiff requested the court to re-open discovery
was Brown v. American Honda Motor Co."'I In Brown a black applicant
for ownership of an automobile dealership was rejected and sued the
manufacturer for discrimination. Nearly a year after discovery closed,
plaintiff requested that the district court re-open discovery to allow
plaintiff to inquire into a specific agreement between the Equal Employ188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
929 F.2d at 607.
Id.
932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1575.
Id. at 1580.
Id. at 1580-81.
939 F.2d 946 (11th Cir. 1991).
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ment Opportunity Commission and a manufacturer of defendant (a nonparty). The district court denied plaintiff's motion to re-open discovery,
and plaintiff appealed.196
The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not err in denying
plaintiff's motion to re-open discovery. 1 7 The court relied on previous
case law which held that a plaintiff may not compel discovery from a defendant's related corporations or separate units of the same corporation
absent a showing of "'particularized need and relevance.' "198 The Eleventh Circuit reiterated that the scope and extent of discovery was within
the trial court's discretion.1 99 The court held the particular agreement
plaintiff wanted to inquire into was not clearly relevant to the litigation
and would not justify overturning the district court's ruling and allowing
it to be discoverable.2 00 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit stated the trial
judge correctly held that 1discovery in this case be confined to the local
20
units of the corporation.

VIII. JUDGES

In the case of Wilkinson v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.,202 the Eleventh
Circuit discussed the judge's obligation in relation to jury instructions. In
Wilkinson a passenger of the cruise line sued the cruise line for injuries
she received when an automatic sliding door ran over her toes. Following
a jury trial, the court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the
passenger.20 3 The cruise line appealed on several issues, one of which was
that the trial court erred in failing to give the following requested instruction: "Should the jury find that the plaintiff would have suffered psychiatric injuries from a non-liability cause even if she had not suffered any
injuries on board the [cruise line], that any damages awarded must be
20
reduced to reflect that likelihood." '

The Eleventh Circuit held the refusal of the trial court to give the
cruise line's requested jury instructions regarding the passenger's susceptibility to psychiatric injury was not an abuse of the district court's discretion.2 0 The court discussed the law regarding the trial judge's obliga196.
197.
198.
1978)).
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205,

Id. at 948.
Id. at 954.
Id. (quoting Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 592 (5th Cir.
Id.
Id.
Id.
920 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1562.
Id. at 1569.
Id. at 1570.
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tion to submit various requested instructions to the jury. 06 The Eleventh
Circuit stated "[t]he trial judge's refusal to give the requested instruction
[was] not error where the substance of that proposed instruction was covered by another instruction which was given.

' 20 7

The court went on to

state:
If a requested instruction is refused and is not adequately covered by
another instruction, the court will first inquire as to whether the requested instruction is a correct statement of the law. In such a scenario,
if the requested instruction does accurately reflect the law, the next step
is to assess whether the instruction addresses an issue that is properly
before the jury. Even if both of these criteria are met, there must still be
a showing of prejudicial harm that resulted from the failure of the trial
court to give the requested
instruction before the judgment will be dis20 8
turbed on that ground.
In this case, the district court decided that the general language of another charge that was the standard aggravation charge dealing with" 'any
aggravation of an existing disease'" adequately covered the issue of plaintiffs susceptibility to psychiatric injury.209 The Eleventh Circuit agreed
with the district court's finding and also found noteworthy the fact that
defendant had fully and forcefully argued this particular point in its closing argument.210 Thus, after viewing the record and the instructions as a
whole, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court's denial of the
2 11
requested instruction was proper.
Also during this term the Eleventh Circuit, in Johns v. Jarrard,212 reviewed extensively the responsibility of a trial judge to assist and guide
the jury to a just result. In Johns the parents of an infant who died in a
hospital brought a wrongful death action against the emergency room
physician, the corporation that supplied the emergency room physician,
and the on-call surgeon.2 2 Apparently, the physician on call had written
on the emergency room record "rule out ruptured viscus. 214 Despite all
the efforts of the doctors, the infant died at the hospital, and an autopsy
revealed she had died from a lacerated liver.2

206. Id. at 1569-70.
207. Id. at 1569 (citing Pesaplastic, C.A. v. Cincinnati Millicron Co., 750 F.2d 1516, 1525
(11th Cir. 1985)).
208. Id. at 1569-70 (citations omitted).
209. Id. at 1570 (quoting the district court).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. 927 F.2d 551 (11th Cir. 1991).
213. Id. at 553.
214. Id. at 552-53.
215. Id. at 553.
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During the jury's deliberations, the jury asked the judge the following
questiom "In the testimony it was mentioned that Dr. Fisher in his diagnosis ruled out a ruptured viscus. Was he asking or telling Dr. Thomasson
that a ruptured viscus should be ruled out?"21" The district judge initially

refused to answer the jury's question, but then asked the jury to rephrase
' The
it. Subsequently, the judge answered the question by saying "no. 121
jury eventually returned a verdict for defendants and plaintiff appealed
alleging that the judge's statement misled the jury and resulted in an im6
21

proper verdict.

The Eleventh Circuit stated: "[iut is the inescapable duty of the trial
judge to. . . guide, direct, and assist [the jury] toward an intelligent understanding of the legal and factual issues involved in their search for
truth. ''2 2" The Eleventh Circuit also noted a district court could comment

on the evidence and ask questions of witnesses as well as elicit facts that
had not been adduced or clarified when they were presented.2 0 However,
the responsibility of a federal trial, judge not to mislead the jury, when
responding to their question, when it is clear that the jury is confused on
a specific subject, is extremely high.221 In this case, the Eleventh Circuit
found the district court's response to the jury's question misleading.22 '
The Eleventh Circuit stated that the jury was focusing on a "non-issue"
and, therefore, the district court should have given supplemental instructions designed to address the jury's apparent confusion and refocus their
attention on the central issue in the case. 23 Instead, by replying "no" to
the jury's question the district court created an issue when none had previously existed.2' 4 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiff was enti22
tled to a new trial on the merits.
IX.

1

CONCLUSION

As is evident by this year's decisions, the Eleventh Circuit continues to
guard procedural safeguards with a great deal of care. With the increased
volume of cases every year, simply following the rules of the game has
become of great importance to all practitioners. Some of the cases de216. Id.
217.

Id. at 553-54.

218. Id. at 554.
219. Id. (citing 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2556 (1971)).
220. Id.; see also Hanson v. Waller, 888 F.2d 806, 813 (11th Cir. 1989).
221.
222.

927 F.2d at 555.
Id.

223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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cided this term dealt with clarifying exactly what the rules are and others
dealt with reiterating the old standards and requirements of practicing in
federal court. Litigators in the future will not only have to be aggressive,
intelligent, and articulate, they will have to continue to be extremely proficient in mastering the rules of the game.

